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ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: PER SE CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCHARGE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUALLY HOSTILE
WORK ENVIRONMENTS UNDER TITLE VII
Sarah H. Perry
Abstract: In Title VII sexual harassment cases based on hostile work environments,
application of the constructive discharge doctrine imposes unfair burdens on claimants. A
finding of constructive discharge requires a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment
than that required for finding a hostile work environment. This forces many hostile
environment victims to remain in abusive and intolerable conditions because they cannot
afford to resign. Unless found constructively discharged by their employers, victims who quit
their jobs cannot recover back pay for the period between resignation and judgment. The
incorrect and inconsistent application of the constructive discharge doctrine in sexually hostile
environment cases causes this result. A per se rule that necessitates finding a constructive
discharge when a sexually hostile work environment is found provides a uniform and fair
solution to the problem.

Imagine a woman named Jane who works in a small manufacturing
company.' Jane's supervisor, a twenty-eight-year employee of the
company, begins to discuss very personal matters with her, including the
lack of a sexual relationship with his wife. He tells Jane that he wants a
personal relationship with her and bombards her with unwelcome
invitations for drinks, lunch, dinner, and breakfast. He also makes lewd
references to parts of her body and becomes belligerent when Jane rejects
his advances. This harassment causes Jane to suffer severe bouts of
trembling and crying, eventually requiring hospitalization.
The
emotional distress keeps Jane away from the office on sick leave for a
few months. Upon her return to work, the harassment continues.
Jane finally complains about the harassment to her company's
personnel manager. Despite her complaint, the company delays
investigation. Nevertheless, the company eventually finds that Jane's
supervisor has been harassing female employees for several years.
Although the company disciplines the supervisor with demotion, the
company fails to prevent him from entering Jane's work area. After
finding her former supervisor at the desk next to her own and hearing his
explanation that he has been assigned there indefinitely, Jane resigns.
1. These facts are based on those in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). Although
victims and perpetrators of sexual harassment may be men or women, sexual harassment almost
always involves a male perpetrator and a female victim. David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment at
Work, C742 ALI-ABA 465, 473 (1992). For this reason, this Comment will refer to the victim as
female and the harasser as male.
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She then brings a Title VII action against her employer for sexual
harassment and constructive discharge.2
Jane uses her best efforts to find comparable employment after her
resignation, but she is unsuccessful. Three-and-one-half years later, the
court finds her employer liable for sexual harassment due to a hostile
work environment under Title VII. The court reasons faat the company
is liable because it had knowledge of the harassment but failed to take
prompt and effective remedial action. However, the court concludes that
Jane was not justified in quitting her job, and, therefore, she may not
recover back pay for the three-and-one-half years from resignation until
judgment. Jane is also not entitled to punitive damages from the
employer under Title VII. The court concludes that she may only receive
damages for her pain and suffering.
The constructive discharge doctrine as applied in Title VII hostile
environment actions requires victims like Jane either to remain in
intolerable and abusive conditions or to resign and risk losing back pay.
It is important to find a constructive discharge rule that is fair to both
victims and employers. For over a decade, circuit cotx;ts have applied
different constructive discharge tests, resulting in varying standards for
sexual harassment victims. Moreover, courts have misapplied these
tests. As a result, victims are subjected to inconsistent iesults and unfair
burdens. A uniform rule that is easy to apply would provide a more just
result and promote prompt adjudication of sexual harassment claims. In
light of a recent circuit court decision confirming that employers can
effectively shield themselves from sexual harassment liability,3 such a
rule would also be fair to employers.
This Comment addresses the problems encountered by Jane and other
victims of sexual harassment who quit their jobs in response to a hostile
2. A constructive discharge occurs when an employee is forced into resignation even though not
formally discharged by the employer. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanving text. Constructive
discharge claims are frequently brought with claims of discrimination. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily
Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985) (including claims of age discrimination and constructive
discharge), cert. denied,475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th
Cir. 1980) (including claims of sex discrimination and constructive discharge); Calcote v. Texas
Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978) (including claims of racial discrimination and constructive
discharge); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975) (including
claims of religious discrimination and constructive discharge).
Lin Farley, a professor and researcher of sexual harassment, notes that it is not uncommon to find
working women who have left more than one job over their working careers because of sexual
harassment, even though doing so may severely penalize them economically. Lin Farley, Sexual
Shakedown: The Sexual Harassmentof Women on the Job24 (1978).
3. See Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994).

Constructive Discharge
and abusive work environment. Part I examines the relevant history of
the sexual harassment and constructive discharge doctrines, and the
relationship between the two doctrines.
Part II highlights the
inappropriateness of the current approaches to constructive discharge in
the hostile environment context, and proposes a rule that would
necessitate a finding of constructive discharge when a court finds a
sexually hostile work environment. Finally, part II argues that the
proposed rule is fair, promotes the purposes of Title VII, and is supported
by public policy.
I.

THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE

A.

Sexual HarassmentBased on Hostile Work Environment

Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Act or Title VII).4 The Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of "sex," but neither the statute nor legislative history define
what constitutes discrimination based on sex.'
Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has conclusively established that sexual harassment is sex
discrimination under Title VII 6 The Court noted that Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimination,
intimidation, ridicule, and insult based on sex.7
Circuit courts have developed the elements necessary to find a hostile
environment.8 Claimants must show (1) that the employee is a member
of a protected group; (2) that the employee was subjected to unwanted
sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the

4. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his [sic] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
5. "Sex" was added to Title VII only one day before the House of Representatives approved the
statute, and the limited floor discussion provided no insight into the intended definition of the word.
EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VFII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1005, 3213-32 (1968);
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385,386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,404 U.S. 950 (1971).

6. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66 (1986).
7. Id. at 65.
8. This Comment refers to sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment as a "hostile

environment' or "sexually hostile environment"

Other forms of discrimination giving rise to a

hostile environment are not within the scope of this Comment, and any references thereto are clearly
identified.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:541, 1995

harassment affected or unreasonably interfered with a term, condition, or
privilege of employment; and (5) respondeat superior.9 Most hostile
environment litigation focuses on the fourth and fifth elements.
To satisfy the fourth element of the hostile environment claim, the
harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
The Supreme Court elaborated on this standard in
environment.1
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." The Harris Court reaffirmed that the
harassing conduct need only be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-one that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-and concluded that the
victim must subjectively perceive the environment 1:obe hostile or
abusive.12 Although the Court did not define "severe or pervasive,"
circuit courts seem to focus on the pervasiveness element."3 The required
showing of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.14

9. Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065
(1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (lth Cir. 1982). Accord Collins v.
Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing the last element as
"some ground to hold the employer liable"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992).
Respondeat superior means that "a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his
servant, and a principal for those of his agent.... Under [this] doctrine an employer is liable for
injury to person or property of another proximately resulting from acts of employee done within
[the] scope of his employment in the employer's service." Black's Law Dictionary 1311-12 (6th ed.
1990). See also infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
10. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67. The absence of a noticeable decrease in productivity is not necessary
when evidence shows that the harassment had an impact on the victim and made it more difficult for
her to do herjob. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1994).
11. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
12. Id. at 370-71.
13. E.g., Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining
that the complaining employee must prove that the conduct was sufficiently pervasive to create an
offensive environment); Jones, 793 F.2d at 720 (approving trial court's focus on the pervasiveness
of harassment).
Courts have required that claimants show a pattern of offensive conduct "before finding a hostile
environment. E.g., Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting
that relatively isolated incidents of non-severe misconduct will not support a hostile environment
claim); Carrero, 890 F.2d at 577 (stating that the incidents of harassmeat must be sufficiently
continuous and concerted to be deemed pervasive for finding a hostile environment); see also
EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6681,
405:6690 (1990); Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassmentin Employment, C780 ALI-ABA 131, 14344(1993).
14. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).

Constructive Discharge
Under the fifth element for finding a hostile environment, respondeat
superior,employer liability is governed by agency principles. 5 A recent
decision by the Third Circuit identifies three agency situations where an
employer may be liable: (1) when torts are committed by employees
within the scope of their employment; (2) when the employers are liable
for their own negligence or recklessness; and (3) when the harassing
employee relied upon apparent authority or was aided by the agency
relationship.16 Negligence by the employer in failing to prevent or
correct the harassment is the most common ground for employer
liability. 7 Most courts have held that the employer is liable when it had
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment but failed to take
appropriate remedial action. 8
In determining employer liability for hostile environment, in some
circuits it is relevant that a supervisor is the perpetrator.' 9 For example,
the Second Circuit has determined that when the perpetrator is either a
co-worker or a low-ranking supervisor who did not rely on his apparent
authority and was not aided by the agency relationship, the employer will
be liable only if it either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or
knew of the harassment but did nothing to remedy it.2" The employer
may be liable in other situations, however, regardless of the absence of
notice or the reasonableness of the complaint procedures. 2 This liability
15. The Supreme Court has recommended that courts look to agency principles for guidance in
determining employer liability. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
16. Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,780 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
17. Kadue, supranote 1, at 489. See also infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distrib., 981 F.2d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1992).
19. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779-80. Although the Second Circuit has applied different standards for
employer liability depending on whether the harasser is a supervisor, other courts have not made this
distinction. See, e.g., Davis, 981 F.2d at 343. Further discussion of this issue is outside the scope of
this Comment.
20. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. Accord Davis, 981 F.2d at 343 (holding the employer liable for
hostile environment created by a supervisor when the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir.
1991) (agreeing that remedies by an employer should be reasonably calculated to end the
harassment).
The complainant may demonstrate employer knowledge of the harassment with evidence that shb
complained of the harassment to higher management. Waltman v. International Paper, 875 F.2d 468,
478 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(concluding that the employer had full knowledge of the alleged offense after receiving a formal
complaint). The pervasiveness of the harassment may also give rise to the inference of employer
knowledge or constructive knowledge. Waltman, 875 F.2d at 478.
21. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. The Supreme Court has held that lack of notice does not necessarily
shield an employer from Title VII liability. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986).
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may occur when a high-ranking supervisor is the harasser or when a
supervisor uses either his actual or apparent authori.y to further the
harassment or was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by
the existence of the agency relationship.'
Another factor in determining employer liability is the effectiveness of
the employer's grievance procedure. In Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,2 the Supreme Court noted that the mere existence of a grievance
procedure and a policy against discrimination, together with a claimant's
failure to invoke the procedure, does not insulate the employer from
liability.24 The Court recognized, however, that it is more likely that an
employer will be able to insulate itself from liability if its grievance
procedures are calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come
forward.' The Third Circuit recently clarified how an employer can
shield itself from Title VII liability for hostile environment. The court
concluded that a grievance procedure which (1) is known to the victim
and (2) 26timely stops the harassment will protect the employer from
liability.
B.

ConstructiveDischarge

Constructive discharge claims are often brought with hostile
Even though an employee is not formally
environment claims.'
discharged by her employer, a court may consider her constructively
discharged if conditions at the workplace forced her into resignation. 28 A

22. Karibian,14 F.3d at 780.
23. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
24. Id. at 72. In Vinson, the employer's policy against discrimination did not specifically address
sexual harassment, and the grievance procedure required the employee to first complain to her
supervisor, the alleged harasser. See also EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F:Zd 1504, 1516 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding employer liable for sexual harassment despite employee'3 failure to invoke the
grievance procedure when the discrimination policy did not specifically proscribe sexual harassment
and the internal grievance procedures required initial resort to the supervisor accused of engaging in
or condoning the harassment).
25. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 73.
26. Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994).
27. See, e.g., Smith v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 943 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1991) (including allegation
that hostile work environment resulting from sexual harassment forced the victim to resign); Ramsey
v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1(04 (10th Cir. 1990) (including allegations of hostile
environment and constructive discharge), cert.denied, 113 S. CL 302 (1992); see also supranote 2.
28. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

546

Constructive Discharge
finding of constructive discharge allows a claimant to recover back pay
for the period between resignation and judgment.29
The doctrine of constructive discharge originated in cases under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)." The NLRA expressly forbids
unfair labor practices, including discrimination based on union
membership.31 When an employer deliberately makes an employee's
working conditions so intolerable as to force the employee to quit
because of union activities or union membership, the employer has
constructively discharged the employee in violation of the NLRA.32
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)33 set forth the two
elements of constructive discharge in Crystal Princeton Refining Co. v.
InternationalChemical Workers Union:34 (1) the burdens imposed upon
the employee must cause, and be intended to cause, a change in working
conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force the employee to resign;
and (2) it must be shown that those burdens were imposed because of the
employee's union activities."

29. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff was not
entitled to back pay and reinstatement because she was not constructively discharged); Satterwhite v.
Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that employee who quits cannot secure back
pay unless his employer constructively discharged him).
"Back pay" as used in this Comment refers to the period of time after termination of the
employment relationship and is equivalent to what the plaintiff would have earned with the former
employer, less the amount actually earned in other employment up to the date ofjudgment. See, e.g.,
Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905
(1989). However, "back pay" has also been used to refer to the period of time while the employee is
still employed and is the difference between what the plaintiff earned in employment with the
defendant employer and what the plaintiff would have earned without discrimination. See, e.g.,
Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. See, e.g., Crystal Princeton Ref. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 222 N.L.R.B.
1068, 1069 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff's temporary transfer after an unsuccessful union
organizing campaign did not amount to a constructive discharge in violation of NLRA); J.P.
Steven[s] & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding that the employer
constructively discharged the employee because of union activities).
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is now referred to as the Labor-Management Relations
Act (LMRA). 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988). To avoid confusion, this Comment will refer to the Act as
the NLRA.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
32. Id.; J.P.Steven[s] & Co., 461 F.2d at 494.
33. The NLRB is a body created by the NLRA to hear and decide labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. § 153
(1988). The decisions of the NLRB are appealable to the circuit courts. Id. § 160.
34. 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976).
35. Id. at 1069. The Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 894 (1984).
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As the circuit courts began to apply the constractive discharge
doctrine outside the NLRA context, the courts split as to the proper test
to apply. Currently, two circuit courts apply the "employer intent" test,
requiring that the employee show intolerable conditions and the
employer's specific intent to coerce the employee's resignation." The
other circuits apply the "reasonable employee" test, requiring the
plaintiff to demonstrate that her working conditions were so intolerable
that a reasonable person in her position would be compelled to resign.37
1.

The EmployerIntent Test

In applying the employer intent test in cases under Title VII, circuit
courts have been lenient with the intent requirement. These courts have
concluded that intent may be inferred through circumstmtial evidence.3 8
Some courts infer intent when a reasonable employer would have
foreseen that the employee would resign under the circumstances,3 9 while

36. Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs., 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993);
EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992).
37. James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 1994); Stetson v. Nynex Serv.
Co., 995 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1993); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239, 242
(5th Cir. 1993); Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 677 (7th Cir. 1993);
Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755-56 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2708 (1994); AvilesMartinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 1992); Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070,
1079 (3d Cir. 1992); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987); Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987), afd in part and rev'd in part,490 U.S. 228
(1989).
The Sixth Circuit applies a two-pronged test requiring inquiry into the frelings of a reasonable
employee and the foreseeability on the part of the employer. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,
637 (6th Cir. 1987).
Some circuit courts applying the reasonable employee test state that the employer must
deliberately make the employee's working conditions intolerable for a finding of constructive
discharge. See, e.g., Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361; Ugalde, 990 F.2d at 242-43. This test should not be
confused with the employer intent test. See also infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Bristow v. Daily Press, 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding that intent
can be inferred from employer's failure to remedy known intolerable conditions), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1082 (1986). It may therefore be irrelevant whether the plaintiff is required to prove an
improper intent See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 n.2 (4th Cr. 1989) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the result of the employer intent test may be the same as the reasonable
employee test), vacated in parton reh 'g, 900 F.2d 27 (1990).
39. See, e.g., Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 284-85 (holding employer liable for constructive discharge
despite plaintiff's failure to show that employer consciously meant to force her to quit, since the
employer must necessarily be held to intend the reasonably foreseeable consequences of its actions).

Constructive Discharge
others infer intent when the employer failed to act in the face of known
intolerable conditions.4"
2.

The ReasonableEmployee Test andAggravatingFactors
Requirement

Adoption of the reasonable employee test by some circuit courts
created the current split over the appropriate test for constructive
discharge. These courts followed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass'n.41 The rule set forth
provides that if the employer deliberately makes an employee's working
conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary
resignation, then the employer has constructively discharged the
employee.42
The Fifth Circuit later interpreted its decision in Young as setting forth
the reasonable employee test.43 First, in Calcote v. Texas Education
Foundation," the Fifth Circuit required only that acts creating the
intolerable conditions be intended by the employer.4' Then in Bourque v.
Powell ElectricalManufacturingCo., the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted
the reasonable employee test on the grounds that neither Young nor
Calcote required employer intent to force the employee to resign.46 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the trier of fact must only be satisfied that
the working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a
reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt 48compelled to
resign.47 Subsequently, nine other circuits adopted this test.

40. See, e.g., Holsey v. Amour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.

1028 (1985).
41. 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 144. Although this language refers to deliberate action by the employer, it should not be

confused with the employer intent test.
43. Some courts apply a "reasonable woman" standard to eliminate potential male-bias resulting
from application of a sex-blind reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases. See, e.g.,
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991). The policy basis for such a standard may
also apply to the reasonable employee test. Discussion of this issue is outside the scope of this
Comment.
44. 578 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at98.
46. 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 65 (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (lst Cir. 1977)).
48. See supra note 37.
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The reasonable employee test includes a requirement that claimants
prove "aggravating factors. 49 Plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement by
The
showing a continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment."
aggravating factors requirement developed as a result of a reluctance by
the circuit courts to find constructive discharge based upon a single
incident of employment discrimination. For example, i cases involving
unequal pay, discriminatory failure to promote, or unlawful transfer,
circuit courts have held that this discriminatory conduct alone is
insufficient for a finding of constructive discharge." Some courts have
also applied the aggravating factors requirement in the hostile
environment setting, requiring that hostile environment victims
demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the
minimum required to establish a hostile environment. 2
The courts requiring aggravating factors have reasoned that society
and the policies underlying Title VII will be served best if unlawful
discrimination is attacked within the context of the existing employment
relationship whenever possible.53 Thus, employees should not be
allowed to quit at the slightest incident of discrimination. 4 In addition,
49. See, e.g., Bourque, 617 F.2d at 65.
50. Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that plaintiff must
prove aggravating factors such as a "continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment') (citation
omitted). See also Hopkins v. Price Waterho'se, 825 F.2d 458,473 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the
mere fact of discrimination alone is insufficient for a claim of constructive discharge), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part,490 U.S. 228 (1989); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 4.27, 432 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that the continuous course of discriminatory conduct suffered by plaintiff supports a finding
of constructive discharge). But see Levendos v. Stem Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d
Cir. 1988) (refusing to conclude that a single act of discrimination can never compel a reasonable
person to resign).
51. See, e.g., Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that discriminatory
denial of promotion alone cannot comprise a constructive discharge); Irving v. Dubuque Packing
Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that failure to promote, unlawful transfer, or unequal
pay, standing alone, does not amount to a constructive discharge).
One way that unequal pay and discriminatory failure to promote can viol.te Title VII is by being
the result of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment is another form of sex di:,crimination under Title
VII.
52. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the employer
liable for a hostile environment under Title VII but concluding that the harassment was not severe
enough to amount to a constructive discharge), affd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994);
accord Campbell v. Kansas State Univ., 780 F. Supp. 755, 765-66 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that
although a working environment may be severe enough to constitute sexual harassment, it may
nevertheless be insufficiently intolerable to compel resignation).
53. See, e.g., Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986); Bourque v. Powell
Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. See Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding
that claimants should "stay and fight" to remedy Title VII violations).

Constructive Discharge
courts have pointed out that plaintiffs fulfill their duty to mitigate
damages by remaining on the job.'
The reasons behind the aggravating factors requirement have not
convinced all courts that the requirement is necessary. In Ezold v. Wolf,
Block Schorr & Solis-Cohen,56 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
acknowledged the general desire to encourage employees to stay on the
job so that the employer will have a chance to remedy the discriminatory
situation. The court concluded, however, that this goal only makes sense
when a possible solution exists." Other courts have questioned the
mitigation rationale by pointing out that the plaintiff may actually
mitigate damages by leaving her job. 8
C.

Title VllRemedies

A finding of constructive discharge is essential in a hostile
environment case if the victim quits her job and seeks back pay from the
employer. Back pay is available under Title VII, but only if an employee
has been actually or constructively discharged. Although other damages
are available to a limited extent under Title VII, back pay comprises a

significant portion of a victim's losses.
55. Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 389; Bourque, 617 F.2d at 66.
Once the claimant establishes damages, the employer may demonstrate that the claimant failed to
mitigate those damages. EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
the employer failed to prove that the claimant was not reasonably diligent in seeking other
employment and that with the exercise of reasonable diligence there was a reasonable chance that the
claimant might have found comparable employment).
56. 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.), and cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
57. Ad. at 311 (holding the employer liable for back pay because the employee had no opportunity
to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, and requiring her to remain on the job denied her a
complete remedy); Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding that back pay restrictions are inapplicable where the harm is irremediable). Although these
cases dealt with denial of promotion, the reasoning that in some situations a possible solution to
discriminatory conduct does not exist applies to other areas of discrimination as well.
58. Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D.D.C. 1986) (reasoning that denial of back pay to
victim of discriminatory denial of promotion would discourage claimant from mitigating damages by
finding other employment where she would be allowed to advance without discrimination).
Hostile environment claimants who quit their jobs in response to discriminatory treatment mitigate
damages by searching for other employment. See, e.g., Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight
Co., 489 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that back pay after resignation should be
decreased by the amounts earnable with reasonable diligence). Section 706(g)(1) of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act provides that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX1) (Supp. 1993).
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The Act provides a back pay award for victims of discrimination.
Under § 706(g)(1) of the Act, the court may order reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay.59 Circuit courts have interpreted

this section to mean that a victim of sexual harassment may obtain back
pay only if the employer discharged the employee either actually or
constructively.'
Without a finding of constructive discharge, a victim of sexual
harassment can obtain only a limited amount of compensatory and
punitive damages. 61 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991
Amendments) provides that the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the relief authorized
by § 706(g) of the Act.62 Compensatory damages include future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpeouniary losses.63
Punitive damages are appropriate only in cases of reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff's rights or intentional violations of federal
law.M
II.

A PROPOSED RULE TO ADDRESS SHORTCOINGS OF THE
CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The tests for constructive discharge currently applied by the circuit
courts impose unfair burdens on hostile environment victims. Some

59. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Supp. 1993).
60. See, e.g., Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding that an
employee must have been actually or constructively discharged by the employer in order to be
eligible for back pay compensation for lost wages beyond the end of the employment period). But
see Ezold, 758 F. Supp. at 312 (awarding back pay without a finding of comnructive discharge in a
sex discrimination suit). This decision is contrary to the weight of authority.
61. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D) (Supp. 1993). The sum of the
amounts awarded for compensatory damages and punitive damages are -apped by an amount
depending on the size of the defendant employer. For employers with fewer than 101 employees,
this amount is $50,000; for employers with more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees, damages
are capped at $100,000; for employers with more than 200 but less than 501 employees, damages are
capped at $200,000; and for employers with more than 500 employees, camages are capped at
$300,000. Id.
62. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 198Ia(a)(1) (Supp. 199:;). Before the 1991
Amendments, back pay was the only potential relief for a sexual harassmert victim aside from an
injunction. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412,423 (7th Cir. 1989). In some cases,
back pay may still be the only form of relief available to hostile environment victims.
63. Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. 1993).
64. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 936 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30,51 (1983)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 53 (1993).
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courts have added a requirement that claimants meet a higher threshold
for constructive discharge liability, preventing many victims from
recovering back pay. Furthermore, circuit courts have been applying
different constructive discharge tests for well over a decade, causing
inconsistent results and uncertainty for sexual harassment victims.
Consequently, victims are forced to remain in abusive work
environments simply because they cannot afford to risk losing back pay.
This result not only rewards the employer, but it is unjust and violates
public policy.
The current state of the law concerning constructive discharge in
hostile environment cases should change. This Part proposes adoption of
a per se rule for constructive discharge in hostile environment cases.
Although the employer intent and reasonable employee tests may work
well in other employment discrimination contexts, these tests do not
work well in hostile environment cases. In contrast, the proposed per se
rule provides a fair solution, promotes the Title VII policy in favor of
voluntary compliance, and is. supported by public policy.
A.

The Current Testsfor ConstructiveDischargeAre Inappropriatein
HostileEnvironment Cases

The two tests for constructive discharge currently applied by the
circuit courts are inappropriate in the hostile environment setting. The
Title VII context is different from the NLRA context where the employer
intent test originated, and the test must be adjusted to fit Title VII causes
of action. Although some courts have modified the employer intent test
to make it less stringent, the modified test is unnecessary as it fails to add
anything to the test for hostile environment liability. Finally, the
reasonable employee test is misapplied in the hostile environment
context, resulting in an unfair and unjust threshold for constructive
discharge liability.
1.

The Employer Intent Test

Requiring employer intent for a finding of constructive discharge is
inappropriate in hostile environment cases. Because the constructive
discharge doctrine originated in response to employers attempting to
force union employees into resignation," the intent element was
appropriate. However, the nature of the discrimination under Title VII
65. See supranotes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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differs from that under the NLRA. In the Title VII context, the employer
does not necessarily want the victim to quit, and so the original reason
for requiring employer intent does not exist. Moreover, Title VII is
aimed at the consequences or effects of the employment practice and not
at the motivation.66 Therefore, the constructive discharge test should be
adjusted to fit Title VII complaints.
Circuit courts applying the employer intent test in Title VII cases have
recognized that proving employer intent is difficult, and have modified
the intent requirement to make it less stringent.67 Some courts infer
intent when a reasonable employer would have foreseen that the
employee would resign, while others infer intent when the employer
failed to remedy known intolerable conditions. 68 However, neither of
these tests adds anything to the standard already established for a finding
of hostile work environment, and requiring a second test for constructive
discharge is unnecessary and burdens scarce judicial resources.
It is always foreseeable to an employer that a hostile environment
victim will resign if the employer fails to promptly stop the harassment.
Studies conducted on victim response to sexual harassrnient suggest that
victims respond to the harassment by quitting their jobs. 69 At a
minimum, employers should be held to have constructive knowledge of
this tendency.70 It is not unreasonable to require personnel departments
66. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
239 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). The Supreme Court has implicitly adopted
this interpretation. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (focusing on the
effect of a hostile environment on the employee).
67. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
69. Farley, supra note 2, at 21 (citing surveys by the United Nations and Cemell University). See
also Barbara Gutek, Sex and the Workplace: The Impact of Sexual Behavior and Harassment on
Women, Men and Organizations74 (concluding that women may quit or ask fbr a transfer when the
harassment gets out of hand rather than report the harassment to authorities); Christine 0. Merriman
& Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title V1, 13
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 83, 84 n.6 (1984-85) (citing a 1979 study by the Working Women's
Institute finding that 66% of the respondents lost their jobs as a direct result of sexual harassment
and that 42% were eventually forced to quit when the working environment became intolerable).
But see James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment:A LiteratureReview, 74 Soc. &
Soc. Res. 3 (1989) (noting that quitting or transferring is found infrequently as a response to sexual
harassment).
Victims of sexual harassment usually seek redress outside the employment relationship only after
having been fired or having quit. Farley, supra note 2, at 27. Although a small percentage of
sexually harassed women quit immediately, approximately one-fourth first ignore the harassment
and then quit after the situation worsens. Id. at 21-22.
70. Courts have applied a "should have known" standard for knowledge in the Title VII context,
and the same standard should apply here. See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d
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to make inquiries into why employees quit their jobs, nor is it
unreasonable to assume that employers should know of this information.
Employers should therefore foresee that victims of sexual harassment
will quit if the hostile environment is not remedied.
Some circuit courts have also inferred employer intent from an
employer's failure to remedy known intolerable conditions.7 1 However,
this is equivalent to the standard for employer liability under Title VII for
hostile environment.72 Therefore, a finding of a hostile environment
should mean that the victim is also constructively discharged.
2.

The ReasonableEmployee Test andAggravatingFactors
Requirement

The reasonable employee test as applied in hostile environment cases
is also inappropriate.73 Misapplication of the aggravating factors
requirement has resulted in an unfair burden on hostile environment
victims. With proper application, the test becomes redundant and
unnecessary. Moreover, the reasoning behind the aggravating factors
requirement is inapplicable in hostile environment cases, and, by
definition, a finding of hostile environment satisfies the reasonable
employee test.
The Fifth Circuit has misapplied the constructive discharge rule in
concluding that the pervasiveness of the harassment necessary for a
finding of constructive discharge is greater than that necessary for a
finding of hostile work environment. In Landgraf v. USI Film
Products,4 the Fifth Circuit found a Title VII violation resulting from a
sexually hostile work environment after the victim reported the
harassment to her supervisor on several occasions and the employer
failed to take timely corrective action.7 5 However, the Fifth Circuit held

959, 966 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding the employer liable for sexual harassment by a co-worker when it
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective action); Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding the employer liable for sexual harassment when it
knew or upon diligent inquiry should have known of harassment by supervisor); see also supranote
20.
71. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
73. However, application of the reasonable employee test may be appropriate in cases involving
other forms of discrimination under Title VII. Discussion of this issue is outside the scope of this
Comment.
74. 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), aft'don othergrounds, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).

75. Id. at 429.
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that the claimant was not constructively discharged because she did not
satisfy the aggravating factors requirement.76
Contrary to the Landgraf holding, the reasonable employee test's
aggravating factors analysis should always be satisfied in hostile
environment cases. In Landgraf,the Fifth Circuit relied on an unequal
pay case to justify its conclusion that a constructive discharge claimant
must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than
the minimum required to prove hostile work environment.7 7 Although
aggravating factors may be necessary to show constructive discharge in
unequal pay cases," a hostile environment is unlike an unequal pay
environment in that a hostile environment involves a continuous pattern
of discriminatory treatment.79 This continuing discrimination satisfies
the aggravating factors requirement." Therefore, there is no need for the
requirement in the hostile environment setting.
Even if courts continue to apply the aggravating factors analysis in
hostile environment cases, the rationales for the requirement are
inapplicable. First, circuit courts have stated that society and the policies
underlying Title VII will be best served if the unlawful discrimination is
attacked within the context of the existing employment relationship
whenever possible.8 1 In the ideal situation, a victim of discrimination
will remain in the workplace while the employer attempts to fix the
problem. However, the reality is that women tend to quit when they are
sexually harassed. 2 Empirical data showing how women really react
should be the basis for judicial decision making.
The second rationale given by circuit courts for requ:.ring aggravating
factors is that plaintiffs must fulfill their duty to mitigate damages by
remaining on the job.83 However, as some courts have noted, mitigation
does not always occur by remaining on the job.84 In the hostile
environment context, forcing victims to remain on the job is likely to
76. Id. at 430.
77. Id. (relying on Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.

1981)).
78. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
79. See supranote 13.
80. See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Attacking discrimination within the context of the
existing employment relationship is consistent with the Title VII polizy favoring voluntary
compliance. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
82. See supranote 69 and accompanying text.
83. See supranote 55 and accompanying text.
84. See supranote 58 and accompanying text.
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encourage increased psychological harm and other nonpecuniary
damages available under Title VII.s
Victims of hostile work
environments can mitigate damages by escaping from the abusive
environment and searching for another job with "reasonable diligence.""
This will result in less compensatory damages under Title VII and a setoff from the amount of back pay awarded.
Finally, the reasonable employee test, by definition, is satisfied by the
finding of a hostile environment. The presence of a hostile environment
means that a reasonable person would find the harassment sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment. 7 Reasonable persons
would not want to remain in an environment that is abusive and
intolerable, 8 and they would feel compelled to resign from such an
environment.
B.

A ProposedPerSe Rule

In every case where an employer is found liable for a sexually hostile
environment, a victim who has quit in response to the hostile
environment should be considered constructively discharged and entitled
to recover back pay from the employer. Hostile environment victims
who quit for reasons other than those directly related to the harassment
would not be covered by the rule. However, the rule would extend to
victims who resign after the employer has remedied the hostile
environment if the resignation was in response to psychological distress
caused by the harassment.8 9 A causal connection between the hostile
85. In Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987), the victim of the hostile environment
suffered from such severe emotional distress at work that she was hospitalized on at least two
occasions. Id. at 632. See also Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 375 (W.D.N.C.
1988) (noting that the sexual harassment victim suffered from depression, anxiety, seizures,
vomiting and chronic diarrhea as a result of the harassment). A hostile environment victim is not
required to have a nervous breakdown before Title VII relief will be awarded. Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
86. See supranote 58.
87. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
88. The Supreme Court's decision in Harrissupports the conclusion that discrimination which is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment is absolutely intolerable.
See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (holding that the hostile environment claimant need not prove
psychological injury for Title VII recovery).
89. This proposition does not contradict the recent Third Circuit decision in Bouton v. BMW of
N. Ar., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994). See supra text accompanying note 26. Only if the
employer fails to provide an effective grievance procedure under Bouton would the proposed per se
rule impose liability for constructive discharge.
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environment and the resignation must be found before: the per se rule
comes into play.'
C.

The ProposedPerSe Rule Should Be Applied in Hostile
EnvironmentI Cases

The proposed per se constructive discharge rule provides a fair
solution to the problems created by the current constructive discharge
tests. The proposed rule does not impose an undue burden on employers
and it fully compensates hostile environment victims. In addition, the
rule encourages the Title VII policy of voluntary compliance. Finally,
the per se rule is just, promotes prompt adjudication of hostile
environment claims, and decreases burdens on the judiciary.
1.

The PerSe Rule Is Fairto Employers

The high threshold for employer liability for hostile environment
protects employers from being subjected to unfair liability under the per
se rule. Circuit courts have held that an employer must have actual or
constructive knowledge of the hostile environment and fail to take
sufficient remedial action before it is held liable for the hostile work
environment. 9 Therefore, once employer knowledge is shown, an
employer may avoid liability by proving that it took prompt and adequate
steps to remedy the situation.92 This standard also allows an employer to
shield itself from liability with a grievance procedure which is known to
the victim and timely stops harassment.93

90. Resignation several months after the last incident of harassment is a factor in determining
causation. It should be noted that a hostile environment victim may not be able to afford immediate
resignation if she has no other employment opportunities. See Troutt v. Charcoal Steak House, Inc.,
835 F. Supp. 899, 902 (W.D. Va. 1993), afid, 37 F.3d 1495 (4th Cir. 1994). Also, the harassment
need not "be the straw that broke the camel's back." Barbetta v. Chemla m Serv. Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a four-month delay in resignation is not dispositive in
the constructive discharge determination). However, when the resignaticn is unrelated to the
harassment, the victim would not receive back pay under this rule.
91. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
92. Domhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix, 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the employer not
liable for sexual harassment when it promptly responded to the complaint).
93. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Although some courts have found no constructive
discharge on the grounds that the victim failed to invoke the grievance procedure, see, e.g., Cuestra
v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 805 F. Supp. 451,459 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that plaintiff
was not constructively discharged when plaintiff had other alternatives to resigning, such as
invoking the grievance procedure), whether a victim invoked the grievance procedure is a factor in
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An employer can further insulate itself from liability by structuring its
grievance procedure so as to encourage victims to come forward.94
Many victims of sexual harassment perceive that filing a formal
complaint will be ineffective. Studies reveal that most female victims of
sexual harassment are unwilling to use internal grievance procedures
because they believe that nothing will be done.95 Some women will not
complain or use grievance procedures because of the male domination of
the workplace and the difficulty of pitting their word against that of their
supervisor or other high-ranking perpetrator.96 The validity of the belief
that a formal complaint procedure would have been ineffective is
litigated as part of the sexual harassment claim, and employers can avoid
liability by addressing these concerns.
2.

The PerSe Rule Is Fairto HostileEnvironment Victims

Victims of hostile environment can be fully compensated for their
losses only by receiving back pay awards. The Supreme Court has stated
that one purpose of Title VII is to "make whole" victims of unlawful
Because many victims of sexual
employment discrimination.97
harassment quit their jobs in response to the harassment,9 8 many victims
lose their source of income when they resign. A sexual harassment
allegation coupled with a claim for constructive discharge may not reach
judgment for a few years, and a victim of hostile work environment who
quits her job as a result of the harassment may be without income for that
period of time. These victims can be "made whole" only by receiving
back pay awards.
Awarding back pay to victims of hostile environment is also
consistent with the Court's position regarding back pay awards under
Title VII. The Court has held that a finding of employer liability for
employment discrimination under Title VII triggers a rebuttable
determining employer liability.
Therefore, the sexual harassment doctrine addresses the
effectiveness of the grievance procedure.
94. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
95. Farley, supra note 2, at 22; Gutek, supra note 69, at 72. Women also fail to use internal
grievance procedures because they fear the public exposure that might jeopardize future employment
opportunities. Gutek summarized the situation as follows: "In many cases, the woman simply
decides that leaving the job is the least painful alternative for her, even though her own career will

suffer." Id at 74.
96. Farley,supra note 2, at 23.
97. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). The statute is intended to give the
courts the discretion to fashion the most complete remedy possible. Id. at 421.
98. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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presumption that the claimant is entitled to back pay.99 Back pay awards
should be denied only for reasons which would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of both eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past

discrimination."re Not only does the per se rule help make victims whole,
but adding back pay to hostile environment liability under Title VII
increases the incentive for employers to eradicate sexual harassment in
the workplace, since financial liability is substantially :less without back
101
pay.
3.

The PerSe Rule Supports Title VII Policies

An additional Title VII goal is voluntary compliance."° Currently, the
interposition of a constructive discharge claim frustrates this goal by
permitting employers to escape liability with little more than a slap on
the hand. In contrast, the per se rule acts as a general deterrent,
encouraging employers to make every effort to avoid liability by
implementing effective grievance procedures and working with victims
to remedy any alleged sexual harassment. °3 Voluntary compliance will
decrease court time and costs for all parties involved, as well as decrease
burdens on the court system. Moreover, out-of-court resolution of sexual
harassment disputes preserves the reputation of both the employer and
employee and lets the victim escape the trauma of having to testify on
the stand about a very personal and emotional experience.
4.

Public Policy Callsfor a PerSe Rule

The per se rule satisfies our sense of justice by preserving human
dignity. At least one court has recognized that a woman does not have to
endure a hostile environment in order to keep her job until she can find
99. United States v. City of Chicago, 853 F.2d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 & n.45 (1977)).
100. Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 421. Although this statement was made in a context
where the victims of discrimination had not quit their jobs, the same reasoning applies where the
victims have quit.
101. E.g., Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (awarding $94,000 in back
pay to a claimant constructively discharged on the basis of race).
102. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,228-29 (1982).
103. Although victims of sexual harassment have tended to quit their jobs before making an effort
toward settlement, see supranote 69 and accompanying text, the threshold for employer liability for
hostile environment is currently high enough so that per se constructive discharge will not encouragei
more employees to quit. See supranotes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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other work."' Requiring hostile environment victims to remain in the
work place means requiring them to remain in conditions that are hostile
or abusive. It is likely that some victims who cannot afford to risk losing
back pay will be forced to endure continuing psychological and possibly
physical injury before the environment is remedied. In fact, the situation
may not be remedied until judgment. Imposing such abuse on victims of
hostile environments undermines human dignity and violates our sense
of justice.
Finally, the per se rule promotes other public policies, including the
policies in favor of prompt adjudication of claims, minimal court costs,
and a decreased burden on the judiciary. The rule is easy to apply and
will create uniformity in redressing hostile environment violations of
Title VII. The current state of the law requires choosing one standard for
constructive discharge over another, often based on the inconsistent and
confusing language of earlier decisions. Constructive discharge rules are
difficult to apply in hostile environment cases because the tests have not
been adequately modified for the hostile environment setting. A uniform
rule is easier to understand and easier to apply, encouraging prompt
adjudication of claims and minimizing the costs of trial. Uniform
standards for Title VII damages provisions also increase the
predictability of Title VII awards and decrease the burden on the
judiciary.
III.

CONCLUSION

Courts currently require a higher threshold for constructive discharge
liability than that required for finding a sexually hostile environment. As
a result, these victims are required to prove a higher level of harassment
than other Title VII victims in order to be found constructively
discharged, forcing them to remain in hostile and abusive conditions.
This treatment is patently unfair. In sexually hostile environment cases,
the current constructive discharge tests are inappropriate and wrong. The
per se rule provides a just result for employers and victims, supports
Title VII policies, reinforces human dignity, and furthers our sense of
justice.

104. See Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993).

